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'ON HOW TO DISCERN THE TRUTH OF RELIGION', BY ḤUNAYN B. ISḤĀQ THE IMPERSONAL RECENSION**

SUMMARY: This article contributes to the study of Christian Arabic literature by providing an introduction and English translation of the treatise entitled *Kayfiyyat idrāk ḥaqīqat al-diyāna*, 'On how to discern the truth of religion', by the prominent Baghdad-based Nestorian physician, scholar and translator, Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq (808-873). This work constitutes a defence of Christianity in a multi-religious milieu marked by the ascendency of Islam. Ḥunayn discusses therein the reasons that lead people to adhere to a particular religion, his main contention being that the truth or falsity of any religion can be ascertained by examining the reasons why it was originally accepted.

To the memory of Maurice Borrmans, M.Afr. (1925-2017)
May his passion for truth continue to inspire us all

Sidney Griffith has accurately described the prominent Baghdad-based Nestorian physician, scholar and translator, Abū Zayd Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq al-ʿIbādī (al-Ḥīra 808 – Baghdad 873), as "a public intellectual of record", "one of the first Christians whose stories are widely told in the Arabic annals of Muslim learning in Abbasid times, by both medieval and modern authors"[1]. Regrettably, despite Ḥunayn's prolific output

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** This article has already been published in *Islamochristiana* 44 (2018) 163-171, unfortunately with some unforgivable printing errors. The editorial staff apologizes to the author and to the readers, and asks them to consider only this new version.

[1] S.H. Griffith, "From Patriarch Timothy I to Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq: Philosophy and Christian Apology in Abbasid Times; Reason, Ethics and Public Policy", in M. Tamcke (ed.), *Christians and Muslims in dialogue in the Islamic Orient of the Middle Ages* [Beiruter Texte und Studien, 117], Orient-Institut, Beirut; Ergon Verlag in Kommission, Würzburg 2007, 83. See also R. Haddad, "Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq apologiste chrétien", *Arabica* 21 (1974) 292-302; M. Cooperson, "The Autobiography of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq", in D.F. Reynolds (ed.), *Interpreting the Self: Autobiography in the Arabic Literary Tradition*, University of California Press, Berkeley 2001, 107-118; J.T. Olsson, "The Reputation of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq in Contemporaneous and Later Sources", *Journal of Abbasid Studies* 3 (2016) 29-55; and G. Strohmaier, "Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq", *Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE* (first published online: 2017).

(260 translations and 100 original compositions on different subjects are attributed to him[2]), only a few works have survived the vicissitudes of time to bear witness to his intellect. Among them is a short treatise entitled *Kayfiyyat idrāk ḥaqīqat al-diyāna*, 'On how to discern the truth of religion'. As the title suggests, this work constitutes a defence of Christianity in a multi-religious milieu marked by the ascendency of Islam. Ḥunayn discusses therein the reasons that lead people to adhere to a particular religion, his main contention being that the truth or falsity of any religion can be ascertained by examining the reasons why it was originally accepted.

The treatise has reached us in two different recensions[3]. The shorter one is part of a correspondence involving one Ibn al-Munağğim, most likely the Abbasid courtier 'Alī b. Yaḥyā al-Munağğim (d. 888), and the Melkite scholar Qusṭā b. Lūqā (d. ca. 920?), in which Ḥunayn responds to Ibn al-Munağğim's defence of the prophethood of Muḥammad and call to Islam[4]. In this shorter recension, as Barbara Roggema remarks, Ḥunayn's rejection of Islam emerges more openly. The longer, more impersonal recension, on the other hand (offered below in English translation, in which Islam is never mentioned), presents itself as a rational explanation of the ways in which truth can be distinguished from falsehood in matters of belief[5]. The treatise thus begins with the question: "How does a person know that what he believes is true and that what someone else believes is false?"

The reader is immediately made aware of the view that Ḥunayn wishes to oppose, namely, the position of those who may be tempted to think that in matters of religious belief there is no external, objective criterion to adjudicate between truth and falsehood.

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[2] B. Roggema, "Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq", in *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History*, Vol. 1 (600-900), ed. D. Thomas et al., Brill, Leiden 2009, 769.

[3] Roggema, "Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq", 775-779.

[4] Scholars are divided as to the precise identity of this member of the renowned Banū al-Munağğim family. For the arguments, see B. Roggema, "'Alī ibn Yaḥyā ibn al-Munajjim", in *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History*, Vol. 1, 762-767; M.N. Swanson, "A Curious and Delicate Correspondence. The *Burhān* of Ibn al-Munajjim and the *Jawāb* of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 22 (2011) 173-174; and [Samir] Khalil Samir and P. Nwyia, "Une correspondence islamo-chrétienne entre Ibn al-Munağğim, Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq et Qusṭā ibn Lūqā", *Patrologia Orientalis* no. 185, vol. 40, fasc. 4 (Brepols, Turnhout 1981) 538-543. See also S. Khalil Samir and I. Zilio-Grandi, *Ibn al-Munağğim - Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā (IX secolo), Una corrispondenza islamo-cristiana sull'origine divina dell'Islām*, *Introduzione, testo arabo e traduzione* [Patrimonio culturale arabo cristiano, 8], Silvio Zamorani, Torino 2003; [Samir] Khalil Samir, "Liberté religieuse et propagation de la foi chez les théologiens arabes chrétiens du IXè siècle et en Islam", in *Tantur Yearbook 1980-81* (Tantur Ecumenical Institute for Theological Research, Jerusalem 1981) 149-155.

[5] According to Roggema ("Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq", 776), although both recensions are clearly two versions of the same work, there is no clear indication as to which one was the original version. More recently, Swanson ("A Curious and Delicate Correspondence", 181) has argued that the personal recension came first as part of Ḥunayn's response to Ibn al-Munağğim and that later the impersonal recension was excerpted from it and circulated by itself, after receiving a new introduction and being expanded in some places. For the opposite view, see Samir, "Liberté religieuse et propagation de la foi", 151.

If asked about their conviction of following the truth, the adherents of the different religions will reply with similar arguments, invoking their ancestors' beliefs, or a book, or a prophet who performed signs, or their own considered opinion. Moreover, whoever adheres to a religion on the strength of these arguments has to accept any religion he encounters that can claim such evidence, or else compromise his intellectual consistency and integrity. Against this sort of epistemological impasse, the Nestorian scholar advances the view that "the truth or falsehood of all doctrines is known only by the reasons that prompted their acceptance from the beginning" and that "the reasons why falsehood is accepted are other than the reasons why the truth is accepted", thus providing a criterion to discern the truth of a religion. He goes on to enumerate six reasons for accepting falsehood and four reasons for accepting the truth, asserting that it is inconceivable that people should adhere to a particular form of worship without there coming into play at least one of the said ten reasons.

Next, after stating the logico-theological premise that the true worship of God (*al-'ibāda al-ṣaḥīḥa*) could not have been accepted for any of the six unworthy reasons for accepting falsehood, Ḥunayn reviews the early spread of Christianity to show that this was indeed the case here. At this point, almost as an afterthought, he adds a seventh reason why a false religion may be accepted, namely, because of the easy, readily convincing teachings it proposes. This was not the case for Christianity, however, contends the Nestorian scholar, because nothing appeared more difficult to accept than the teaching of the Apostles. It follows that the reason why Christianity was accepted as the true worship of God "must be found necessarily among the four reasons why the truth is accepted, whether it be all [four] of them or [only] some of them".

Ḥunayn concludes the treatise by declaring that the Christian religion was originally accepted only on the basis of the display of signs and miracles that accompanied the apostolic preaching and leaves it to non-Christian readers who may be inclined to disagree to reflect upon the reasons why their own religion – or any other religion, for that matter – was accepted in the first place, in the conviction that they will find that there is no comparison between those religions and Christianity.

As Roggema notes, Ḥunayn's treatise, *Kayfiyyat idrāk ḥaqīqat al-diyāna*, is not the only example of a Christian Arabic text from early Abbasid times that advances the idea that the truth of a religion can be ascertained by looking at the motives people have for adhering to it. This apologetic strategy – which Mark Swanson has aptly called "the true religion apology"[6] – is already found, across confessional divisions, in the first generation of Christian intellectuals writing original works of theology in Arabic, such as the Melkite Theodore Abū Qurra (d. ca. 830), the Jacobite Abū Rāʾiṭa al-Takrītī (d. probably soon after 830) and the Nestorian 'Ammār al-Baṣrī (d. ca. 850). Griffith has underlined the originality of this scheme of negative criteria – "devised specifically in the effort to exclude Islam from any claim to be the true religion" – as constituting a

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[6] M.N. Swanson, "Apology or its Evasion? Some Ninth-Century Arabic Christian Texts on Discerning the True Religion", *Currents in Theology and Mission* 37 (2010) 394.

unique Arab Christian contribution to the apologetic/polemical enterprise in Christian thought[7].

The English translation that follows is based on the critical Arabic edition of Ḥunayn's treatise published by Samir Khalil Samir in 1997[8]. Samir established his edition on the basis of three manuscripts[9] and the already published editions of Louis Cheikho (1906)[10] and Paul Sbath (1929)[11]. I have also consulted the 1998 edition by Wadi Abullif Malek Awad [Wadīʿ Abū al-Līf Mālik ʿAwaḍ] of the *Maǧmūʿ uṣūl al-dīn* ('Compendium of the principles of religion'), by the Egyptian Coptic scholar al-Muʾtaman b. al-ʿAssāl (fl. 1230-1260), who included Ḥunayn's treatise in chapter 12 of his theological encyclopaedia[12]. Samir's edition served as basis for Stephen J.

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[7] S.H. Griffith, *The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque: Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2008, 98. See also, by the same author, "Comparative Religion in the Apologetics of the First Christian Arabic Theologians", *Proceedings of the PMR Conference: Annual Publication of the Patristic, Medieval and Renaissance Conference* 4 (1979) 63-87. For the original arguments see I. Dick, *Théodore Abuqurra. Traité de l'existence du créateur et de la vraie religion: introduction et texte critique* [Patrimoine arabe chrétien, 3], Pontificio Istituto Orientale, Rome; al-Maktaba al-Bulūsiyya, Jounieh 1982, 259-270; English trans.: J.C. Lamoreaux, *Theodore Abu Qurrah*, Brigham Young University Press, Provo 2005, 41-47; C. Bacha, *Mayāmir Thāwdūrus Abī Qurra usquf Ḥarrān: aqdam taʾlīf ʿarabī naṣrānī*, Maṭbaʿat al-Fawāʾid, Beirut 1904, 71-75; English trans.: Lamoreaux, *Theodore*, 49-53; S. Toenies Keating, *Defending the 'People of Truth' in the Early Islamic Period: The Christian Apologies of Abu Raʾitah*, Brill, Leiden 2006, 82-95 (§§ 1-10) (Arabic text and English trans.); M. Hayek, *ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī: Apologie et controverses* [Recherches. Nouvelle série B. Orient chrétien, 5], Dar el-Machreq, Beirut 1977, 24-41 (Arabic). On ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī's arguments concerning the true religion and the reasons for accepting the Christian religion, see Wageeh Y.F. Mikhail, ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī's *Kitāb al-Burhān*: a topical and theological analysis of Arabic Christian theology in the ninth century, PhD diss., University of Birmingham 2013, 48-99. An English translation of *Kitāb al-Burhān* is provided in Appendix II (pp. 351-409).

[8] S. Khalil Samir, "Maqālat Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq fī 'Kayfīyat idrāk ḥaqīqat al-diyāna'", *al-Mashriq* 71 (1997) 345-363.

[9] MS Vat – Ar. 103, fols 140v-143v (13th c.), MS Oxford, Bodleian Library – Ar. Chr. Uri 38 no 7 (Huntington 240) (1549-50) (fols 111v-113r), and MS Paris, BNF – Ar. 200 (16th c.).

[10] L. Cheikho, "Un traité inédit de Ḥonein", in C. Bezold (ed.), *Orientalische Studien: Theodor Nöldeke zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (2. März 1906)*, Alfred Töpelmann, Giessen 1906, 283-290 (Arabic text and French trans.); Arabic text reproduced in L. Cheikho, *Seize traités théologiques d'auteurs arabes chrétiens (IXe-XIIIe siècles)*, Imprimerie catholique, Beirut 1906, 121-123; and Idem, *Vingt traités théologiques d'auteurs arabes chrétiens (IXe-XIIIe siècles)*, 2ème éd. augmentée, Imprimerie catholique, Beirut 1920, 143-146. Cheikho's edition of Ḥunayn's *Kayfiyyat idrāk ḥaqīqat al-diyāna* was made on the basis of two manuscripts available to him: MS Beirut, Université St Joseph – Or. 1089 (573) (14th c.) and MS Beirut, Université St Joseph – Or. 1099 (583) (1860, Karshūnī).

[11] P. Sbath included Ḥunayn's treatise in his *Vingt traités philosophiques et apologétiques d'auteurs arabes chrétiens du IXe au XIVe siècle*, H. Friedrich, Cairo 1929, 181-185. The edition was based on three manuscripts of his own collection: MS Sbath 1589 (1249-50), MS Sbath 1001 (13th c.?), and MS Sbath 1040 (1787-8).

[12] Al-Muʾtaman b. al-ʿAssāl, *Summa dei principi della Religione*, Vol. 1: *Testo del Proemio e dei cap. 1-19*, ed. A. Wadi [Studia Orientalia Christiana Monographiae 6a], The Franciscan Centre of Christian Oriental Studies, Cairo 1998, 278-283 [§§ 1-23]. This edition is based on ten manuscripts, the oldest of which are MS Vat – Ar. 103 (13th c.) and MS Paris, BNF – Ar. 201 (13th-14th c.).

Davis's English translation of Ḥunayn's treatise, published online: http://www.
tertullian.org/fathers/sbath_20.1_Hunain_ibn_Ishaq.htm (consulted 21 November
2018). My translation is no more than a revision of Davis's excellent work, which it
largely follows except in those passages where I offer a different interpretation of the
Arabic text. The importance of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq in the history of Christian Arabic
literature and the originality of "the true religion apology" within the general history
of Christian thought justify any effort to advance our comprehension of his treatise. The
numbers between square brackets correspond to the paragraph numbering of Samir's
edition. They are given so that the interested reader may easily check the translation
against the Arabic text.

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ON HOW TO DISCERN THE TRUTH OF RELIGION
BY THE WISE ḤUNAYN B. ISḤĀQ, THE NESTORIAN PHYSICIAN
(MAY GOD HAVE MERCY UPON HIM)

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He said:

[2] How does a person know that what he believes is true and that what someone
else believes is false?

[3] Indeed, if that person says that what he believes has come to him by way of his
ancestors, or if he says that it has come to him by way of a book or from a prophet who
has performed signs, or from his own considered opinion, then for him his own religion
is confirmed in this way, and likewise all the adherents of [other] religions who disagree
with him would be able to say something similar.

[8] If that response is shared by all the adherents of the [different] religions, it
follows necessarily then that whoever adheres to his religion on the basis of this
argument must accept any religion he encounters also on the basis of this same
argument. For, if he did not accept such an argument from those who disagree with him,
neither would that argument be accepted from those who profess his doctrine.

[11] To the one who says this, we say that the truth or falsehood of all doctrines is
known only by the reasons that prompted their acceptance in the first place. The
reasons why falsehood is accepted are other than the reasons why the truth is accepted.

[14] The reasons for accepting falsehood are six:

[15] The first reason is that the one who accepts [falsehood] is compelled to accept
against his will what has been imposed upon him.

[16] The second reason is that of the person who willfully tries to escape unbearable
hardship and oppression, so as to be delivered from them to what he hopes will bring
him ease and comfort.

[18] The third reason is that of one who values power over humiliation, distinction
over abasement, strength over weakness, so that he abandons his religion and adheres
to another.

[20] The fourth reason is that the proponent of the doctrine, being a wicked man, artful in speech, varnishes falsehood so as to give it the appearance of truth and seduces whomever he invites to [accept] it.

[22] The fifth reason is that he [the proponent of the doctrine] exploits the ignorance and lack of refinement of those he invites to [accept] it[13].

[23] The sixth reason is when there is a natural kinship between the one invited [to accept a false doctrine] and the other person, so that the former, not wishing to cut the ties of kinship acquiesces to the latter in his religion.

[25] Now, the reasons why the truth is accepted are four:

[26] The first reason is that the one who accepts [the truth] is witness to signs that are beyond the powers of a human being to perform.

[27] The second reason is that the one who invites [another to embrace the truth] offers an invitation to something that bears external testimony to the truth hidden within it.

[28] The third reason is that logical demonstration obliges one to accept it.

[29] The fourth reason is that the end of the matter corresponds to its beginning, and what happens afterwards and admits of no doubt validates what preceded it[14].

[32] This induces us to reflect on how we may know that all the other religions have been accepted only on the basis of those [first] six characteristic reasons, whereas the true religion has been accepted on the basis of the [latter] four.

[34] It would take me too long to mention every single one of the religions: those ancient ones that were proven false when what supported them proved to be false, as well as those that developed later, whose support was like that of the ancient religions that proved to be false; for, insofar as we know that what supported them proved to be false, the later religions were proven false, just as those that existed before them were proven false.

[38] Anyone who wants to understand for which of these reasons his religion was accepted originally, and whether it was one of the reasons for accepting falsehood or one of the reasons for accepting truth, must examine whoever accepts that religion

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[13] According to Swanson's insightful analysis ("A Curious and Delicate Correspondence", 179-180), the fourth and fifth reasons for accepting falsehood show that Ḥunayn had purposely constructed his response to turn Ibn al-Munağğim's central argument on its head. In effect, the Abbasid courtier had claimed that the extraordinary transformation of the Arabs from barbarism to civilization bore witness to Muḥammad's prodigious intelligence and that such an intellectually gifted individual could not have challenged his opponents to produce speech as fine as the Qurʾān unless he had divinely revealed knowledge that the challenge could not be met.

[14] I follow here the Arabic text as established by Sbath (*Vingt traités philosophiques et apologétiques*, 182), stripped of what I take to be scribal comments which were later copied into the body of the text to produce the textual tradition that Cheikho, Samir and Wadi are following in their respective editions. Still, the translation of this fourth reason remains tentative, as I am not completely sure that even Sbath's edition represents Ḥunayn's original text. I thank Mark Swanson for the very helpful exchanges we had on this particular issue.

now and for what reason he accepts it – whether it is on account of one of the reasons for accepting truth or one of the reasons for accepting falsehood, so that from his findings in his own time, he will understand the reasons for which it was accepted in times past, since its very beginning.

[43] And [it is incumbent upon him] that he perceive that the truth is something to be accepted on its own merits, while falsehood requires reasons by which it becomes ingrained in the one who accepts it. For indeed, whoever reflects on this perceives immediately which form of worship is the true one and which is the false one.

[46] Now I will refrain from mentioning the remaining forms of worship, and will instead explain that my own form of worship has only been accepted for the reasons for which the truth is accepted, whether it be for all of those reasons or [only] some of them.

[48] I say that it is incomprehensible that people should accept a particular form of worship without [at least] one of the reasons why every religion is accepted. Indeed, it is unimaginable apart from the ten characteristic reasons that we have enumerated, with six of them being the reasons for accepting falsehood and four being the reasons for accepting the truth.

[52] If it is correct that not one reason for accepting the [true] worship of God is to be found among the reasons for accepting falsehood, then the reason for accepting this [true] worship must be found necessarily among the four reasons why the truth is accepted, whether it be all [four] of them or [only] some of them.

[54] And if it is found that the reason for accepting the form of worshiping God to which we adhere is not among the reasons for accepting falsehood, but is rather that the reasons for accepting our form of worship are diametrically opposed to them, then the truth of the matter [regarding our worship of God] is established and adjudicated. Indeed, we find the matter to be just so.

[58] Examination of each of the reasons [for accepting falsehood]:

[59] With regard to the first reason, [our religion] was not made acceptable through the might of a king, nor through subjugation by a ruler. But rather, all the kings and rulers of the earth have been hostile to it and have kept the people away from it by means of all kinds of torture and unseemly killing and have driven them away from the land. And yet it has vanquished all of them and has remained firm.

[64] With regard to the second reason, [our religion] has not invited [people] to abandon a life of hardship and difficulty for a life of plenty and ease. But rather, it has invited [them] from all the more plentiful and easier forms of life to a life that is harder and more difficult, to that which is almost an object of loathing. And yet, it has been accepted in a most excellent way!

[68] With regard to the third reason, [our religion] has not invited [people] from abasement to high standing, or from humiliation to power. But rather, it has invited [them] from power to humiliation. And yet, it has been accepted, even to the extent that whoever has accepted it would rather die for it than live [deprived of it].

[71] With regard to the fourth reason, [our religion] was not received from people who included the wicked and the skillful in speech. But rather, it was only received

from the ignorant and speech-impaired, and from fishermen, who were dimmer and more speech-impaired than the fish!

[73] With regard to the fifth reason, those who have accepted [our religion] were neither ignorant nor stupid, neither plebeian nor uncivilized. But rather, they were versed in logic and philosophy, more than anyone else in the world, people of discernment and scholarship, surpassing the rest in wisdom.

[76] With regard to the sixth reason, whoever accepted [our religion] was not joined with his loved ones and with his friends as a result of it. Rather, once that person accepted it, for its sake he parted ways [if necessary] with everyone with whom he had common kinship – whatever that kinship might be, whether through blood relationship or through affection.

[78] Now if you would like to add a seventh characteristic reason, look at what the Apostles propagated about the [Christian] religion, in comparison to which nothing appeared more difficult [to accept][15].

[81] If all of these matters are thus, then no one should claim that we have accepted that to which we adhere on any other basis but the display of signs and miracles. To say otherwise would be impossible [for anyone] except an opponent who projects his own experience.

[84] If you say this, then seek for yourself, with respect to your religion as well as the other religions, what resembles that which we have described to you regarding [the acceptance of] our religion. Indeed, you will learn on the spot that there is no comparison between them and us.

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[15] This seventh reason for accepting a false religion is what Theodore Abū Qurra had described as "the persuasion of vulgar minds (*qunū' al-'aql al-sūqī*)" (Lamoreaux, *Theodore*, 49), in other words, that the new religion proposes simple or familiar teachings that are easily understood by the plebeian masses. Theodore argued that this reason could not account for the acceptance of Christianity at the hands of the Apostles. It is worthwhile to quote him at some length here:

"The gospel says that Christ the Son of God was begotten of the Father before the ages and that the Father is not prior to him. It says that this Son at the end of time descended to take up residence in the belly of a woman and from her was begotten as a man, while remaining God as he always had been. It says that he was a child in the cradle, who suckled and through eating came to reach maturity. The gospel says that this eternal Son offered sacrifices to God in the temple and that because Herod sought him, he fled to Egypt. It says that he fasted, was tempted by the devil, and prayed; that he felt hunger and thirst and grew tired; that fear came on him, so that he sweated sweat that was clotted like blood; that his enemies seized him, and insulted and disgraced him when they spat in his face; that they beat him about the head, flogged him, and crowned him with thorns; that they mocked him, nailed his hands and feet, and hung him on a piece of wood; that they gave him vinegar and gall to drink; that they pierced him with a lance; that blood and water flowed out from him; and that, while this was happening, he cried, 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' All this the gospel says of Christ. There is no one whose mind could be persuaded that God is thus described or that such things could happen to him" (Lamoreaux, *Theodore*, 51).

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article contribue à l'étude de la littérature arabe chrétienne en fournissant une introduction et une traduction anglaise du traité intitulé *Kayfiyyat idrāk ḥaqīqat al-diyāna*, « Comment discerner la vérité de la religion ». Ce traité a été écrit par Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq (808-873), médecin nestorien, éminent écrivain et traducteur, basé à Bagdad. Cet ouvrage offre une défense du christianisme dans un milieu multireligieux, marqué par la montée de l'islam. Ḥunayn y discute des raisons qui poussent les gens à adhérer à une religion particulière. Son principal argument est que la vérité ou la fausseté de toute religion peut être vérifiée en examinant les raisons pour lesquelles elle a été d'abord acceptée.