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ISLAM'S INTEGRATION IN SPAIN

SUMMARY: Muslim presence in Spain is much more recent than in other European countries so at times it is not clear if there is a real integration model in this country. Nevertheless, looking at the judicial framework permits the identification of quite a clear model of religious pluralism integration, which has allowed the Muslim community to establish itself and grow in Spain since the onset of democracy. The quick growth of the Muslim community is today pushing this model to its limits. The integration model is partially inspired by Catholic social–thought views on religious freedom and democracy and can be qualified as moderate communitarianism. A view from the Muslim perspective allows us to perceive the achievements of this model as well as to foresee some developments that will be necessary in order to meet today's challenges.

It is not easy to know Spain's exact current Muslim population. The fact that many Muslims do not have Spanish nationality or are even in irregular circumstances in Spain, together with the interest of different institutions in exaggerating or reducing their numbers, makes it difficult to pinpoint an exact number, but it must be between 1.3% (600,000) of the population according to State sociological studies[1], and the 3% (1,400,000) that Muslim sources claim[2]. A foreign source like the *Pew*

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[1] Spain's present population is 46 million. Cfr. Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, «Estudio 2776: Religión II (10/20/2008)», 2008, http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/EN/1_encuestas/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=10382.

[2] Cfr. Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, «Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Explotación estadística del censo de ciudadanos musulmanes en España referido a la fecha 31/12/2013.», *Observatorio Andalusí*, 2014, http://observatorio.hispanomuslim.es/estademograf.pdf.

Research Center affirms that the Muslim population is currently 2.1% (975,000)[3]. The great majority of Spain's Muslim population belongs to Sunni Islam, although there is also a small number of Muslims who belong to the *Ahmadi* Mission. Regarding their origins, the majority of Spain's Muslims are of Moroccan origin (45%) followed by those of Spanish origin (32%), Pakistani origin (4.6%), and Algerian origin (3.6%)[4].

A question that arises on seeing these numbers is: how is Spanish society integrating this Muslim population? Which model of integration is it following? This is not an easy question if we take into account Spain's Catholic past, as well as its history, shaped by the early conquest of Spain by Islamic Berber and Arab armies in 711 and the following war against Islam during the *reconquista*.

In this sense, experts usually identify two main models of religious pluralism integration in Europe: the "communitarian" model and the "assimilationist" model[5]. Both are put to the test when applied to Muslim communities due to their considerable cultural distance from European cultural background along with the great numbers of Muslims present in Europe.

The main example of the "communitarian" model[6] – also called "communitarian insertion" or "multiculturalist" – is in the U.K. where foreign cultures and religions are treated as organized blocks and where dialogue is established with the cultural or religious community as a whole. This model facilitates preserving, strengthening and expressing one's own cultural or religious identity. On the other hand, it seems to have produced a series of segregated identities, even opposing identities at times, living in identity ghettos that show no hope – or desire – for further integration.

On the other hand, the "assimilationist" model seeks to help the individual integration of newcomers by asking them to abandon any trace of communitarian identity and simply accept the main principles and symbols of the welcoming society. The main example of this model is France and its republican laic model of integration

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[3] For the *Pew Research Center*'s 2010 statistics on Spain cfr. «Spain», *Pew Research Center's Religion and Public Life Project*, 2014, http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/spain#/?affiliations_religion_id=0&affiliations_year=2010&region_name =All%20Countries & restrictions_year=2012.

[4] Cfr. Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, «Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana».

[5] Cfr. J.L. Sánchez Nogales, «El Islam en Europa occidental. Panorama socio–histórico y modelos de "integración"», *Proyección. Teología y mundo actual* 233 (2009) 143–154.

[6] We use here the term communitarian in a general sense, a sense that includes a certain model of religious pluralism integration. We do not use it to refer directly to the political philosophy school of thought called communitarianism by authors like Alisdair McIntyre or Michael Sandel, although, nevertheless, there are evident links with this integration model. For a clear explanation of communitarian thought, cfr. W. Kymlicka, *Filosofía política contemporánea. Una introducción*, Ariel, Barcelona 1995, 219–257.

which helps to preserve the cohesion of the host society but represses any claim to identity the individual might have[7].

In general, we could say that both models have failed in their efforts to integrate the Muslim communities. The communitarian model has created ghettos of immigrant population that live following their own cultural identity while isolated from the mainstream culture. The assimilationist model, unable to offer real possibilities of integration and acceptance into the host society, has ended up pushing the newcomers out to marginal areas with no real hope of becoming part of the welcoming society, thus feeding anger and resentment. This dynamic has again produced a process of ghettoization in minority populations. Periodical explosions of violence seen in either the UK or in France are the best proof of this failure.

Spain started to receive immigrants later than other countries. It was only at the beginning of the 90s that migrants from North Africa and Latin American started to come to Spain in large numbers[8]. Therefore, the development of an integration model for foreigners – and particularly Muslim newcomers – has transpired in a shorter period of time and without the same reflection as in other countries. However, a certain trend in Spanish society's efforts with respect to Muslim integration can be identified.

This article will try to clarify these questions. First, the Spanish model of Islamic integration will be presented, particularly in its legal framework. Secondly, this same model will be analyzed from the point of view of Catholic social teaching. Given the Catholic influence in Spain, this is critical in order to fully understand the Spanish model. Thirdly, this model will be critically analyzed from the Muslim perspective itself in order to verify if it can actually represent the reality of Islam. Finally, we will contrast these two perspectives in order to identify any enlightenment from the dialogue between the two traditions.

1. *Spain's model of integration of Islam*

To study a model of integration for Islam it would be necessary to introduce many different perspectives: juridical, sociological, economic, political… Because our space is limited, we will refer here mainly to the juridical framework for the integration of religious pluralism and, in particular, for Islam. This framework can be considered as the explicit ideal inspiring integration; other dimensions could be considered as representing the actual accomplishing of that ideal.

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[7] Today, France does not fully apply the assimilationist model because the State recognizes, and promotes, certain Muslim organizations – such as the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* – as interlocutors cfr. Sánchez Nogales, «El Islam en Europa occidental. Panorama socio–histórico y modelos de "integración"», 152.

[8] However, there has always been a considerable presence of Muslims in the Spanish North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla and, since the 70's, a considerable number of Muslims in Madrid and Barcelona.

In light of the two great European models of integration presented above, Spain's model of integration can be described as mixed although it leans toward the communitarian model. Thus we refer then to a moderate type of communitarianism which is clear when we analyze the laws that deal with religious pluralism.

The main inspiration of the Spanish model is article 16 of the 1978 Constitution referring to the right of religious freedom. Paragraph 3 of this article – a paragraph dedicated to the religion–State relationship – says:

No confession will have a State character. Public authorities will take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and will maintain relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and other confessions[9].

This paragraph establishes a separation between religion and the State, which is called a laicity regime. Nevertheless, laicity is characterized in the form of a negation[10] – no confession will have State character – and, at the same time, the State is asked to maintain good and collaborative relationships with religious communities. We can describe this type of State–religion relationship as open and positive laicity[11]. Moreover, following the tradition of 19th century Constitutions, the text wants to take into account Spanish society's sociological reality in terms of religion, which leads to the specific reference to the Catholic Church[12].

The position established in this article was thus developed first for the Catholic Church – in coherence with Catholicism as Spain's majority confession – with which several agreements were signed in 1976 and 1979[13]. These agreements were supposed to put into practice the relationship of collaboration with the Catholic Church required by the 1978 Constitution.

A couple of years later, in 1980, a law for religious freedom was approved by the parliament in order to develop article 16 of the 1978 Constitution[14]. This law recognized the rights of "churches, confessions and communities" to autonomy in both their internal functioning regime as well as in their religious identity (art. 2.2 and 6.1). Moreover, the law allows religions to create foundations and institutions for their own

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[9] «La Constitución Española de 1978», 7 de febrero de 2012, http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/Espana/LeyFundamental/index.htm.

[10] The effort to avoid the explicit use of the term *laicity* can be explained by the wish to distance itself from the 1931 Constitution of the 2nd Spanish Republic which made a harsh use of this term, cfr. C. Corral, *Confesiones Religiosas y Estado Español: Régimen Jurídico*, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid 2007, 89.

[11] Cfr. *Ibid*., 92.

[12] Cfr. M. Revuelta González, *La Iglesia Española en el Siglo XIX: Desafíos y Propuestas*, Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, Madrid 2005, 41.

[13] Cfr. C. Corral y L. de Echevarría (ed.), *Los Acuerdos entre la Iglesia y España*, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid 1980.

[14] Cfr. A. Fernández Coronado (ed.), *Código sobre pluralismo religioso*, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia 2013, 73–76.

ends (art. 6.2). The law also required the Spanish State to establish cooperation agreements with churches, confessions and religious communities previously registered and only after acknowledging their "evident enrootedness" (*notorio arraigo)* in Spain (art. 7.1)

This scheme, based on the recognition of religious communities and the signing of agreements with them, is to an extent inspired by the Italian juridical framework[15]. However, it is probably more affected by previous agreements signed with the Catholic Church, which became a kind of *analogatus princeps* for the treatment of different religions[16]. This reason probably led to dealing with different confessions as homogeneous and organized "religions" with whom it would be possible to negotiate agreements, following the model of the Catholic Church. As is clear in the case of Islam, this view does not respect the reality of many religions.

Moreover, this model of integration clearly expresses the strong influence of history – we could even speak of it as a burden – in the treatment of religious pluralism[17]. In spite of the reference in the 1978 Constitution to the sociological reality of "the religious beliefs in Spanish society", the criterion of "evident enrootedness" in order to sign an agreement with a religion is mostly a historical criterion[18]. The religions considered to be of "evident enrootedness" are, preferentially, the ones with historical presence in Spain: Christianity, Judaism and Islam.

In the case of the Muslim tradition, the agreement required by the 1980 law on religious freedom was signed in 1992[19]. This agreement deals with issues related to the regulation of Mosques (art. 2), imams (art. 3), military service (art. 3), Social Security issues of religious people (art. 5), Muslim marriage (art. 7), religious assistance in the army (art. 8), other religious assistance (art. 9), Islam in public schools (art. 10), economic issues and alms (art. 11), prayer breaks (art. 12), Muslim patrimony (art. 13), and halal accreditation (art. 14). As a development of this agreement, the Spanish government also approved a ministerial order in 1996, in this case about Islamic education in public and private schools.

A major problem regarding these agreements is the need to identify a social organization that could represent Islam. The Spanish State asked the different Muslims associations in Spain to form a federation in order to negotiate the 1992 agreement.

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[15] Cfr. Mª. José Ciáurriz, «La situación jurídica de las comunidades islámicas en España», in A. Motilla (ed.), *Los musulmanes en España. Libertad religiosa e identidad cultural*, Trotta, Madrid 2004, 38–39.

[16] Cfr. L. Martínez Sistach, «La libertad religiosa. Relaciones Iglesia–Estado», *Estudios Eclesiásticos* 86/337 (junio de 2011) 431.

[17] Cfr. J. Moreras, «Spain», in Jorgen S. Nielsen et al. (ed.), *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, Brill, Leiden 2009, 319.

[18] Cfr. Ciáurriz, «La situación jurídica de las comunidades islámicas», 39.

[19] Cfr. Ministerio de Justicia. Gobierno de España, «Acuerdo de cooperación del estado español con la Comisión Islámica de España (aprobado por la Ley 26/1992, de 10 de noviembre)», 31 de marzo de 2012, http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/es/1215197982464/Estructura_C/1215198063872/Detalle.html.

Because such an organization has no roots in Muslim tradition, and because of inner Muslim diversity, it was impossible to gather all Muslims into a single organization. Finally two main organizations appeared: The Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI), formed mostly by Spanish citizens converted to Islam together with the most conservative trend of Islam; and the Union of Spain Islamic Community (UCIDE) formed by Muslims of non–Spanish origin settled in Spain[20] and relatively close to the positions of the Muslim Brotherhood[21]. The Spanish government negotiated simultaneously with both communities, combining them in an artificial entity called the Spain Islamic Commission (CIE)[22].

This complex process of grouping Islamic communities showed the difficulties found by the Spanish system when dealing with religions other than Catholicism. The divisions inside the Muslim communities were also revealed, whether caused by cultural and national origin or by ideological affinities.

Although the agreement with the Muslim community permits Muslim organizations to establish schools and other educational centers (art. 10.6), this has rarely come to pass. At present there is only one Islamic school in Spain, the *Umm al–Qura* School associated with the Madrid Islamic Cultural Center. There was also the seed of a university to be run by the Muslim community, University Ibn Rushd of Córdoba, but its activity ceased due to lack of funds[23].

Thus, the way to integrate different religions into the Spanish juridical scheme is preferentially communitarian in the sense that it recognizes the entity of the religious communities and gives them autonomy in order to regulate certain dimensions of their life. However, this communitarianism is balanced because it is done in order to assure the individual's right to religious freedom, and because this autonomy is clearly limited mostly to issues of the communities' internal organization which is always under State surveillance.

There could be two main reasons for this communitarian preference. On the one hand, there is the example of the treatment of the Catholic Church in the 1978 Constitutions and the following laws. On the other hand, a certain attraction felt by the Spanish political left – traditionally leaning toward the French laicity system – toward Islam, paradoxically, makes them interested in protecting Islamic identity[24].

In spite of this communitarian preference, the increase in the number of Muslims in some regions and cities along with the presence of more fundamentalist positions among Muslims have led some local governments to develop more assimilationist regulations. A good example is the controversy around the prohibition of *ḥiǧāb*

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[20] Cfr. Ciáurriz, «La situación jurídica de las comunidades islámicas», 41–48.

[21] Cfr. *Ibid*., 44–52.

[22] Cfr. J.L. Sánchez Nogales, *El islam en la España actual*, BAC, Madrid 2008, 164–166.

[23] Cfr. Moreras, «Spain», 323–325. There is also a Faculty of Andalusian Studies in a little town in North Granada. It has some kind of connection with *al–Azhar*, but it does not have much work. Its name is Cultural Centre *Az–Zagra*, in Puebla de D. Fadrique.

[24] Cfr. Ciáurriz, «La situación jurídica de las comunidades islámicas», 43.

or *burkas* in some cities in Catalonia[25]. Even the Spanish government has taken into consideration the possibility of regulating these issues although it has not yet done so. Until now, in general, problems related to Muslim dressing codes in Spain have been treated with a good deal of flexibility and dialogue, seeking simple adaptations that would allow Muslims to continue following their traditional dress codes without them interfering in their work or their studies[26]. However, as we have said, this flexibility when dealing with Muslim customs is being questioned in some localities due to the rising level of tension with Muslim communities.

It is not yet possible to evaluate the Spanish model of integration regarding Islam. The short period transpired since the arrival of significant numbers of Muslims in Spain does not allow us to realize the actual extent of their integration. In general, we could say that there have not been major social conflicts related to Islam, as in France or the U.K.[27]. Even so, the percentage of Muslim population is much smaller than in those two countries and it has been shorter–lived. Only within ten or twenty years will we perhaps be able to fully evaluate this model.

2. *A critical reading of Spain's model of Islamic integration from a Catholic perspective*

Approaching the Spanish model of Islamic integration from a Catholic perspective should be done from the Catholic social teaching tradition. It is in this corpus where we find a reflection on the social consequences of the Gospel for the Catholic Church. The arguments formulated by social tradition are inspired in such explicit religious sources as the Scripture, the liturgy, the teachings of the Catholic Church, the writings of the Church Fathers or testimonies of the saints – but also in human reason and experience, particularly in the tradition of natural law[28]. This mixed character is what makes the Church's social tradition valuable and significant not only for believers, but for any possible readers concerned with the welfare of their society.

This social tradition of the Church provides us today with a starting point that is basically recognizing the role of religious pluralism in modern societies, a necessary assertion in order to work for Islam's integration in society. This openness to pluralism is the result of the step the Catholic Church has taken forward[29] in the Second

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[25] Cfr. Moreras, «Spain», 327.

[26] Cfr. A. Motilla, «La libertad de vestimenta: El velo islámico», in A. Motilla (ed.), *Los musulmanes en España. Libertad religiosa e identidad cultural*, Trotta, Madrid 2004, 107–35.

[27] The 2004 terrorist attacks by a Muslim fundamentalist group on several trains in Madrid fortunately did not produce an anti–Muslim reaction in the population due to its interpretation of being involved within the context of Spanish politics.

[28] Cfr. C.E. Curran, *Catholic social teaching, 1891–present: a historical, theological, and ethical analysis*, Georgetown University Press, 2002, 43–45.

[29] The previous position – called the thesis–antithesis position – affirmed that the ideal was a confessionally Catholic State (thesis) and tolerated other religions only for the sake of peace when it was not

Vatican Council Declaration *Dignitatis Humanae* (1965), where religious freedom was explicitly accepted as a consequence of human dignity as asserted by the Scriptures[30]. Therefore, the Catholic social tradition recognizes that, although there is a moral obligation to seek truth, human dignity demands this search to be done in freedom. Therefore, the Church affirms the right of every human being to choose their own religion. This freedom is not only a private characteristic but implies also freedom to develop the social – public – dimension of religion[31].

Regarding the Spanish model of Islam integration, it should first be said that it is very close to the Catholic position in terms of religious freedom and religious pluralism. The reason is the deep connection between Spain's history and Catholicism. Historically the evolution of the Catholic Church has run parallel to the evolution of Spanish society. Therefore, the previous advances in Catholic understanding of religious freedom and democracy during the Second Vatican Council deeply influenced the juridical treatment of religious freedom in the 1978 Constitution. This is explained by the Church's role at the end of Franco's regime and the presence of a majority of Catholics among the politicians who built the new democratic system[32]. We have also mentioned how the relationship between the Spanish State and the Catholic Church in the present Spanish juridical framework for religious pluralism becomes a sort of paradigm for the relationship with any other religion or confession.

We have described the Spanish integration model as a mixed one or a moderate communitarianism where different religious communities are recognized in their entirety and given certain autonomy, but also where the State guards a certain capacity of control. This general view is a good reflection of the present Catholic position on modern societies that some authors define as a communitarian reinterpretation of liberal values[33]. The main values of the liberal tradition, like human rights of individual freedom, are read in a new way that sees them as springing from human dignity but at the same time, dependent also on the community to which the individual belongs.

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possible to impose Catholicism (antithesis), cfr. J.L. Martínez, *Libertad Religiosa y Dignidad Humana: Claves Católicas de una Gran Conexión*, San Pablo–Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, Madrid 2009, 33–37.

[30] "A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man, and the demand is increasingly made that men should act through their own judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty […] This demand for freedom in human society chiefly regards the quest for the values proper to the human spirit. It regards, in the first place, the free exercise of religion in society" (*Dignitatis Humanae*, 1).

[31] *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (CSDC), 421–422.

[32] Cfr. J.M. Margenat, «Espagne, l'après Franco», *Projet*, n.º Special Issue: Le Catholicism Social Européen (septiembre de 2004), 21–26.

[33] Cfr. D. Hollenbach, «A communitarian reconstruction of human rights: contributions from Catholic tradition», in R. Bruce Douglass y David Hollenbach (ed.), *Catholicism and Liberalism: Contributions to American Public Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. 1994, 128.

Prof. Julio Martínez has made an effort to synthesize the model of citizenship present in various documents of Catholic social teaching; he calls this model a "solidary personalism". Any model of citizenship can be taken as the horizon of minority integration because it represents the way the individual is integrated into political society[34]. For Martínez, the keystone of the Catholic model of citizenship is the individual person and his human dignity as the center of all social activity. The affirmation of human dignity is supported in the biblical assertions of human beings as created in God's image and likeness (Gn 1,26)[35] and made son of God by Christ (Rm 8,14–17)[36]. Therefore, the human being has a transcendental dignity that is beyond any particular condition or quality, a dignity that depends only on his human nature[37]. But because of the human being's essentially social condition, the individual person and his dignity are not isolated from others, on the contrary he/she can only feel fulfillment in society, in community with others[38]. This is the main difference with the liberal tradition.

Drawing from the human being's inherent social dimension, the Catholic social tradition affirms the existence of a common good that includes not only material goods but also cultural and spiritual goods[39]. In the words of the Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, this common good can be defined as "the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members a relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment"[40]. It is, therefore, a good that is more than the good of any specific person and that can only be achieved with others[41]. This common good exists at every level where the social dimension of the human being is present: family, association, religious community, State, world. Also inspired by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, and taking into account the human being's social dimension, the Catholic social tradition considers that the basis of our living together in society does not consist of our rights and duties or of laws. The basis of our living together is civic friendship, which supposes a good amount of good will and an altruistic attitude[42]. Civic friendship becomes then also an element of the common good of a society.

The political community, which includes the government, is at the service of civil society and the common good (cfr. Mt 20,24–28). Regarding the State and the

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[34] Cfr. J.L. Martínez, *Ciudadanía, Migraciones y Religión: Un Diálogo Ético desde la Fe Cristiana*, San Pablo–Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, Madrid 2007, 79.

[35] *Gaudium et Spes*, 12.

[36] *Gaudium et Spes*, 22.

[37] *Pacem in Terris*, 8–9; *Gaudium et Spes*, 14; *Evangelium Vitae*, 19–20.

[38] Traditionally the Church reads the Adam–Eve relationship in the creation story as a symbol of this social dimension (Gen 1,27; 2,18). *Gaudium et Spes*, 12; cfr. Martínez, *Ciudadanía, Migraciones y Religión*, 287–288.

[39] *Pacem in Terris*, 57.

[40] *Gaudium et Spes*, 26.

[41] Cfr. Martínez, *Ciudadanía, Migraciones y Religión*, 292–293.

[42] Cfr. *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (CSDC), 390; cfr. *Ibid*., 295.

government, the present Catholic social tradition accepts democracy as the way to allow a citizen to participation in decision–making[43]. The State's role is to build and preserve the common good[44]. The minimum level of social cohesion and organization that the common good requires is called public order and it is the State's responsibility[45]. This public order is just a small part of the complete common good[46]. Among these minimal conditions of the common good, the Catholic tradition includes the exigencies of natural law that should guide State action in society. A good expression of these exigencies is human rights[47].

Because the State's role is just a service to civil society, Catholic social tradition assigns an important role to social groups as intermediaries between the individual and the State: families, civic associations, communities of interest or friendship and religious communities[48]. It is within these communities where the human being finds relationships of solidarity that allow him to reach fulfillment. These communities are also the way through which the individual can actively participate in complex modern societies[49]. In the case of religious communities, they are also the way for believers to fully live their faith and contribute to society through it. The principle of subsidiarity affirms that these intermediary groups should be able to do as much as possible in society, and the State should only intervene when they are not able to fulfill all society's needs[50].

As we see in this synthesis of Catholic social teaching's citizenship model, the religious community is recognized as having an important role in social life and only through it can we attain certain dimensions of the common good. However, as human beings form a single family beyond any particular community, a higher level of social and political organization also has a role to play. Therefore, the State keeps the role of assuring some minimal conditions in society – what we have called public order – which allows it to limit the activity of religious communities. There are, as we can see, many similarities to the Spanish model of religious pluralism integration. In this

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[43] *Centesimus Annus*, 46.

[44] *Pacem in Terris*, 54.

[45] "[S]ociety has the right to defend itself against possible abuses committed on the pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special duty of government to provide this protection. […] Its action is to be controlled by juridical norms which are in conformity with the objective of moral order. These norms arise out of the need for the effective safeguard of the rights of all citizens and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights, also out of the need for an adequate care of genuine public peace, which comes about when men live together in good order and in true justice, and finally out of the need for a proper guardianship of public morality.[…] they are what is meant by public order" (*Dignitatis Humanae*, 7).

[46] *Dignitatis Humanae*, 7, cfr. Martínez, *Ciudadanía, Migraciones y Religión*, 296.

[47] *Pacem in Terris*, 60.

[48] CSDC, 419.

[49] Cfr. David Hollenbach, «Afterword: a community of freedom», in R. Bruce Douglass y David Hollenbach (ed.), *Catholicism and Liberalism: Contributions to American Public Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. 1994, 323–343.

[50] CSDC, 185–188.

model, communities are afforded a certain degree of autonomy (through the signing of agreements) but it is an autonomy inserted within a larger juridical order established and safeguarded by the State.

However, there are also some points of divergence between Catholic social tradition and the Spanish integration model. These points of divergence are related to the moral role of the State in society and to the valorization of a possible Catholic background in a particular culture.

Firstly, regarding the State's role in society, we should acknowledge the drift that Julio Martínez recognizes in Catholic social teaching's latest developments. If in the Second Vatican Council, the State is supposed to have a minimal role just assuring some minimum conditions of justice[51], in later developments of social teaching, the State is asked to have the more active role of defending some implications of moral truth as defined by natural law[52]. The 1978 Spanish Constitution is closer to the model predicated in the Second Vatican Council because the State is just asked to promote the conditions that assure freedom and equality for individuals and groups (art. 9.2) These conditions include, of course, human rights (art. 10.1). The Spanish juridical framework does not demand the State to develop these minimal requirements of human dignity much further.

Secondly, there is the problem of the Catholic background of Spanish culture: should it be veiled in order to assure a real equality for all religious positions in society or should it be accepted as a sociological fact and historical heritage?[53] There is a strong controversy surrounding this point in Spanish society today[54]. For the most laic positions, as well as for members of other religions, this Catholic background poses a real burden for authentic religious freedom. For the Catholic Church, and for a good part of the Spanish population, it is just a part of Spanish history and patrimony[55].

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[51] *Dignitatis Humanae*, 7.

[52] Martínez describes this drift as a passage from a rather republican model of citizenship to a more communitarian one. cfr. Martínez, *Ciudadanía, Migraciones y Religión*, 296–297. Cfr. *Centesimus Annus*, 46.

[53] An example of this controversy is, for instance, the conflicts around the presence of chapels in State universities cfr. ABC, «Desnudas en la capilla de la Universidad Complutense», 11 de marzo de 2011, http://www.abc.es/20110311/madrid/abcp-desnudas-capilla-universidad-complutense-20110311.html; or also the controversy around the traditional presence of the military in the Corpus Christi procession in many Spanish cities, cfr. ABC, «Toledo celebra por primera vez el Corpus sin bandera ni honores militares», 4 de junio de 2010, http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-04-06-2010/abc/Nacional/toledo-celebra-por-primera-vez-el-corpus-sin-bandera-ni-honores-militares_140232384237.html.

[54] Cfr. G. Villagrán, *Public Theology in a Foreign Land: A Proposal for Bringing Theology in Public into the Spanish Context*, Lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken 2013, 313–317.

[55] The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church affirms that it is legitimate to recognize a special role for a specific religion in a society as a result of cultural or historical ties if that does not imply discrimination toward other religions (CSDC, 423).

The 1978 Constitution considers this Catholic background in a sociological way. This is the reason behind the specific mention of the Catholic Church in art. 16.3, which asks the government to develop attitudes of collaboration with the Church as an expression of the beliefs of the majority in Spanish society. This collaborative relationship was specified in the 1976–1979 Church–State agreements. In spite of subsequent agreements signed with other religions, for many the conditions of these agreements involve granting unjustified privileges to the Catholic Church. This is also the opinion of other religious denominations.

However, the official position of the Catholic Church not only defends the sociological approach of the 1978 Constitution and the Church–State agreements, but also defends the value and contribution involved in the Catholic background and heritage of Spanish society, which are part of society's common good. This defense of Catholic influence is especially noticeable in the social teaching of the Spanish Episcopal Conference. Regarding this, Spanish bishops in their 2006 document *Moral orientations in the face of Spain's present situation* affirm that, in their words:

> In our case, this project [the laic mentality] implies the splintering of an entire spiritual and cultural patrimony, enrooted in the memory and worship of Jesus Christ and, therefore, the abandonment of valuable institutions and traditions born and nurtured in this culture[56].

Therefore, for the Catholic social tradition, as it has developed in Spain, religious freedom should go into effect accepting that the presence of a cultural base of Catholic inspiration is an asset. Moreover, this cultural base is today evident in the ranking of the Catholic Church as the most prevalent among the religious denominations in Spanish society. The State's special treatment of the Church is not a veiled confessionalism but just recognition of this sociological fact in its service to Spanish society. The special treatment toward the majority Catholic Church becomes then a paradigm of how to make religious freedom concrete for any other religious community[57].

3. *A critical reading of Spain's model of Islamic integration from a Muslim perspective*

We now turn to the current experience of the Muslim community in Spain and how it reacts to Spain's model of integration. The Muslim presence in Spain is relatively recent; it is only in the last 40 years that significant numbers of Muslims have established themselves in Spain. On observing their inner organization process, we

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[56] "En nuestro caso, este proyecto implica la quiebra de todo un patrimonio espiritual y cultural, enraizado en la memoria y la adoración de Jesucristo y, por tanto, el abandono de valiosas instituciones y tradiciones nacidas y nutridas en esta cultura". Conferencia Episcopal Española, *Instrucción Pastoral: Orientaciones Morales ante la Situación Actual de España*, EDICE, Madrid 2006, párr. 13.

[57] Cfr. Martínez Sistach, «La libertad religiosa. Relaciones Iglesia–Estado», 425–431.

discover a complex reality. On the one hand, there is a constant internal conflict among the diverse trends of Islam. On the other hand, we see how some very dynamic associations, especially those of converted Muslims, have created useful platforms for introducing Islam and making it known in Spanish society. This new presence of Islam is linked to the wishes expressed by the Spanish political and cultural left to review Spanish history. The key word for this task is 'Al Andalus'. The period of Muslim domination is presented as a paradise of ideal coexistence between the three religions or three cultures but this picture does not reflect the truth of historical events. This fantastic re–enactment seems to be a reaction to a basically negative view of Islam that has been shared by most of the Spanish population over the last four centuries. Frequently, this new representation launches a fierce attack on the Catholic Church which has been accused of having destroyed the shine and splendor of Andalusi Muslim culture, as well as of having committed a historical crime: the expulsion of the *Moriscos*[58] and, as a result, the sinking of Spain into cultural darkness for centuries.

In spite of the crises related to the Muslim people in Europe, in general Spanish Muslims have peacefully experienced belonging to Spanish society. Nevertheless, there have been moments of some tension such as the aftermath of Pope Benedict XVI's 2005 speech in Regensburg, or the repeated demand of some Islamic communities to pray in the Mosque–cathedral of Cordova. These occasions demonstrate the need to create good rapport between the Muslim community, the rest of Spanish society and the Catholic Church in order to avoid these potential conflicts.

How can we perceive the feeling of Islamic communities in the legal and social framework established in Spain since the 1992 agreements between the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE) and the Spanish State and the 1996 ministerial order on Islamic education?

From the perspective of Muslim sources, there is not an easy correlation with the Spanish juridical framework. As is well known, classic Islamic law (*fiqh*) contemplates the world through a comprehensive view which unifies reality as a whole. There are three inseparable dimensions of reality that are impossible or very difficult to consider separately: the *Dīn* is the spiritual dimension of the world and usually translated in Western languages as religion; the social and cultural dimension of this reality is called *Duniā*; finally, the political and military aspect is called *Dawla*, usually translated as "State", its exact meaning being "dynasty". A Muslim educated in a traditional fashion cannot isolate each of these three aspects of his "Islamic world"; even Muslims educated in the Western system of education have great difficulties in separating them because of the great role played by the way of life and thinking within the family as found in Mosque and Oratory preaching.

It might seem that a Muslim who lives in an Islamic environment does not sense

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[58] The term *moriscos* refers to Muslims who stayed in Spanish territory after 1492 and who were forced to convert to Christianity in 1501. This community was finally expelled from Spain in 1609.

the need to keep in mind the world of the "other". Islam was born as a winning and victorious system and way of life. That is the reason why Islamic communities did not have – until the twelfth century – any experience of living away from the "house of Islam" or the "house of peace" (*Dār al–Islām* or *Dār al–Salām*) under non–Muslim governments, that is to say, in the "house of war" or "house of unfaithfulness" (*Dār al–Ḥarb* or *Dār al–Kufr*). This lack of experience in their beginnings can be latent in the inclination of the Muslims to shut themselves inside their own world, thinking that they are exempt from knowing and experiencing "other worlds" which in the minds of many Muslims are merely provisional ones and whose existence must be respected only in so much as they can become "house of *Islām*".

That is the way to explain the feelings of frustration and homesickness when confronting a culturally Christian world that resists being transformed into a "house of *Islām*" and has even subdued a part of a former "house of *Islām*", either in the Middle Ages or in the colonial period, both events leaving a terrible mark on the memory of the Islamic world. Perhaps this is the reason why many contemporary immigrants from Islamic countries, and even national converts, claim to strongly respect the Muslim way of life and traditions in Western countries, whereas they pay little attention to learning about the traditions and way of life in these host countries. This state of mind makes integration difficult for many Muslims and Islamic communities in the West who are reaching toward peaceful and harmonious coexistence to try to achieve common interests.

There is also a problem between the Islamic world and Western countries when interpreting the law. There is a very important Islamic lawyer, Muhammad Charfi, critical with the common understanding of Islamic law, who was a professor in the Faculty of Legal Sciences in Tunis and Minister of Education in this country from 1989 to 1994. He is especially critical about a certain series of rules in Islamic law related to three areas: discrimination against women, the Islamic criminal code – which he qualifies as inhuman in his book quoted below – and the lack of authentic freedom of conscience. Those Muslims who are more conservative do agree with these rules, but as Charfi explains, in contrast to Western ideas of rights, "Islamic law is founded upon three fundamental inequalities: the superiority of man over woman; the superiority of the Muslim over the non–Muslim; and the superiority of the free person over the slave"[59]. The disparity compared to the Western belief also extends to the way of understanding the rights of the people: the rights belong first to the community of believers (*umma*) and the community confers them to the individuals. One who abandons the community is an apostate (*murtadd*). He who does not belong to it is unfaithful (*kāfir*) and the one who pretends is a hypocrite (*mušriq*). These three ranks of people do not qualify for the same rights. According to the country and the Islamic frame of mind, these three ranks of people might even have to forfeit their right to life.

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[59] M. Charfi, *Islam et liberté. Le malentendu historique*, Albin Michel, Paris 1998, 123; Spanish translation *Islam y libertad. El malentendido histórico*, Al–Ándalus y el Mediterráneo, Granada 2001.

There is, therefore, clearly a very different understanding of "human rights" than found in the West. Certainly, since Islamic people live in Spain under Western common law, they are supposed to respect these rules. But, on the other hand, this situation produces a clash with the average Islamic mentality, even in the case of Muslim people born in Spain because they live in Islamic atmospheres and circles where Islamic thought and its mindset are effectively at work.

Sometimes, along with the "house of *Islām*" (*Dār al–Islām*) and the "house of war" (*Dār al–Ḥarb*), several scholars mention a third house: the "house of agreement" (*Dār al–Sulḥ*). This "house" must last for ten years as a maximum in classic Islamic jurisprudence. This notion could provide a fundamental basis toward a wider doctrine about the residence of Muslims outside Islamic countries[60]. We must also keep in mind that there are Islamic scholars today, some even among the immigrants in the West, who agree with the Western system of liberty. They are beginning to consider that the juridical notion of the "house of war" that refers to the non–Islamic world is already out–dated, prompting them to search for another way to understand Muslim presence in the West[61]. All these considerations must be taken into account when evaluating the feelings of Muslims living in Spain today under the agreements made with the Spanish State in 1992 and in the 1996 ministerial order.

As already mentioned, the 1992 agreement[62] indicates a type of communitarian integration as mentioned in the introduction: "These rights, first conceived as individual rights of the citizens, also extend indirectly to the communities or confessions of which they form part to achieve their communitarian goals". The communities are thus subject to cooperation with the State, as seen in the next paragraph in the introduction: this subject is concretely the CIE (Spanish Islamic Commission) as the representative of Islam in Spain, although this must be considered a very artificial and fragmented entity since there is a great lack of unity among the Muslims in Spain.

The 1996 ministerial order about Islamic education in public and private schools[63] also shows that the CIE (Spanish Islamic Commission) is subject to this right to regulate Islamic education. In fact, this order accepts as a decree the proposal of the CIE concerning the curricula for teaching the Islamic religion. The naming of Islamic religion teachers was in the 10th article of the agreement of 1992: "The teach-

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[60] Cfr. J.Mª. Fórneas Besteiro, «El fundamentalismo árabe», in M. Varela, A. Ramos, y M. Pérez (ed.), *Las guerras después de la Guerra: el conflicto en Oriente Medio*, Universidad de Granada, Granada 1997, 79–88.

[61] Cfr. T. Ramadan, «El Islam sale del aislamiento en Europa», *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 1998, 8; cfr. also J. Lacomba Vázquez, *El Islam inmigrado*, Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, Bilbao 2001, 118.

[62] Ley 26/1992. de 10 de noviembre, por la que se aprueba el Acuerdo de Cooperación del Estado con la Comisión Islámica de España. BOE 12 noviembre 1992.

[63] Orden de 11 de enero de 1996 por la que se dispone la publicación de los currículos de Enseñanza Religiosa Islámica correspondientes a Educación Primaria, Educación Secundaria Obligatoria y Bachillerato. BOE de 18 enero 1996.

ing of Islamic religious education will be in charge of the teachers from the CIE in agreement with the federation to which they pertain".

On consulting statistical data on the Muslim population, our first observation is that the real state of Islam in Spain is greatly fragmented. There is no peaceful agreement among the large number of associations and federations. Sometimes the media reports on muffled contention among them. Furthermore, the Metroscopia opinion poll (September 2007) shows that 80% of Muslim immigrants affirm they do not belong to any association; only 9% claim to belong to one of them. The primary objective of these organizations is to request a legal statute, new work laws, new regulations at cultural level, freedom for religious practice and propaganda, children's access to the educational system, practice of the Islamic religion, cult places and cultural centers, and so on[64]. In spite of their common objectives, there has been internal contention about who is to have control over Islamic beliefs and religious practice. These organizations, financed by powerful financial entities located in Islamic countries, compete for the ideological control of Islam in Spain.

Regarding Muslim perception of Spanish society, according to the last opinion poll[65] administered to Muslims in Spain, Muslim immigrants enjoy living in Spain, have adapted to the Spanish way of life and are able to practice their religion in peace. They evaluate Spanish society and the political system very well, and express a great trust in its social institutions. They think that the Muslim religion is very important in their lives and affirm that they are very religious and practicing believers, although their concept of practice is quite broad. This religious life is not associated with exclusive or fundamentalist attitudes. A high number declare themselves in favor of tolerance with respect to the religious ideas and practice of others. They do not accept violence as a means to defend or to spread their religious beliefs. They also affirm their wish for a lay State that does not grant special treatment to any religion. A second important feature is their desire to be integrated into the host society. 67% declare that they feel very comfortable in Spain and only 10% affirm the opposite. 83% consider themselves well–adapted to the Spanish way of life. Only 15% say they are exclusively in contact with people of their own religion. They do not perceive difficulties for practicing their religion in Spain; those they point out are mainly material ones. Islamic immigrants hold Spanish society, its institutions and the political system in high esteem. They consider Spain to be a country where there is little rejection to-

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[64] Cfr. J. Mantecón (ed.), *Los acuerdos con las confesiones minoritarias. Diez años de vigencia*, Ministerio de Justicia, Madrid 2003; A. Motilla (ed.), *Los musulmanes en España. Libertad religiosa e identidad cultural*, Trotta, Madrid 2004.

[65] Metroscopia, «Valores, actitudes y opiniones de los inmigrantes de religión musulmana. Quinta oleada del Barómetro de Opinión de la Comunidad Musulmana de origen inmigrantes en España», 2011, http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/1292348745358?blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition& blobheadername2=Descargas&blobheadervalue1=attachment%3B+filename%3DValores%2C_actitudes_y_opiniones_de_los_inmigrantes_de__religi%C3%B3n_musulmana.PDF&blobheadervalue2=1288776698948.

ward the Islamic religion compared to other European countries. On the other hand, Muslims in Spain value the Catholic Church very little.

Opinion polls present an image of a Muslim community that is tolerant, liberal and adapted to the West. However, the integrated face of Muslim immigrants could be magnified because of their desire for social approval: perhaps they are answering the questions in a way meant to please Western society. In fact, recently some studies have been published concerning the increase of radical Islamism among the Muslims living in Spain[66].

In spite of this apparently "perfect situation for integration", a deep look at the current life of Muslim communities in Spain reveals that a radically communitarian and isolated way of life is beginning to develop. In fact, in cities where the number of Muslims is rising, they are inclined to live together usually on the outskirts or in neighbourhoods only for Muslims where they can follow the main prescriptions of Islamic law, especially those on halal food, commerce, clothes, religious holidays, and so on. As a concrete example, what is wrong with the education system is clear: the "coexistence" of young people of different faiths in schools is not giving rise to rapport and understanding in Spain today. The experiments carried out in some schools have had a modicum of success in promoting coexistence within the boundaries of the institution, but once boys and girls are outside of it, things change: everyone returns to their own place. Even inside school bounds, during the breaks students frequently play separately, and sometimes there is a restrained aggressiveness against "the other". Nevertheless, some institutions report a good relationship among the students from different faiths "within" their boundaries. Good integration between Muslim and Christian boys and girls has not yet been achieved. That is to say, Muslim people still seek to create little "houses of *Islām*" within the boundaries of the secular State.

Nevertheless, in today's global Islam we can identify a debate between "Western Islam", that is to say, the Islam of converted people, and orthodox or conservative Islam. The former holds that Islam must "adapt" to the Western way of life. Conservatives think that it is better to conform to the way of life of the countries where they come from; the latter will lean more towards creating a sort of ghetto at the outskirts of big cities or in the countryside. Radicals choose to live camouflaged amongst these conservatives, in the suburb ghettos or in the groups living in the countryside in farming communities.

Unfortunately, among Muslims living in Spain this debate is less evident and we do not see them thinking about their place in Europe. Only Spanish Muslims converted to Islam mull over the characteristics of a modern Islam that they identify with

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[66] J. Jordán, «El terrorismo yihadista en España: evolución después del 11–M», *Real Instituto Elcano*, 2009, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/programas/terrorismo+global/publicaciones/publ-amenaza+espana/dt7-2009; cfr. also J. Valenzuela, *España en el punto de mira. La amenaza del integrismo islámico*, Temas de Hoy, Madrid 2002; G. De Arístegui, *La Yihad en España. La obsesión por reconquistar Al–Ándalus*, La Esfera de los Libros, Madrid 2006.

the Islam that once existed in Al–Andalus, Medieval Spain under Islamic power. They consider that Islam was the most advanced way of life in Europe in those days and they dream of reproducing this type of Islam today in Spain and in the rest of the world.

Another sign of this lack of integration characterizing the strong communitarianism in which the Muslim community currently abides is the absence of communication with other religions. There is no official relationship between the Catholic Church and Islamic organizations in Spain. The Spanish Catholic Church regards Islam as being mainly an issue of immigration. Nevertheless, there are several contacts between Catholic institutions and some Islamic organizations, like dialogues in congresses, courses and workshops on several themes: Islam in Spain, education in schools, religious freedom, Islam and modernity, Christianity and Islam, perception of the "other", and so on. Concrete groups of Christians – parishes, schools, lay persons' associations, and so on – sometimes organise meetings with Islamic communities in their neighbourhoods to pray, dialogue and celebrate some holidays, for example. There is no academic or intellectual debate within the Catholic community about the presence of Islam in Spain, but some perceptive and sensitive groups have begun to consider this issue.

Finally, on appraising the relationship between the average legal way of thinking among Muslims and the legal statute provided by the two decrees agreed upon with the Spanish State, it could be said that they provide an easy framework for Muslim life and that of the Islamic communities in Spain. Indeed, their religion can be practiced freely, they can build Mosques or adapt spaces for their cult, work normally in different fields of the economic and labor markets, find public schooling and private education for their children, enjoy free public medical assistance, and even receive a great deal of economic support from the State or autonomous Regions. Moreover, they find in these aforementioned rules a legal space that allows them to "build" these "little houses of *Islām*" which can be found in many outlying areas of the most important cities in Spain. Perhaps calling them "moderate ghettos" could relay a more balanced idea about the way of life of most Muslims in Spain. There is news from several cities in the United Kingdom where the Islamic law is applied by Islamic law courts under the code of "arbitration courts". Little by little, we hear that this type of thing is beginning to occur in some cities in Spain. This is the main sign that this communitarian way of life is also becoming consolidated among us. What can be said about what the future will bring in this respect? We do not yet have enough experience to complete our assessment of it.

4. *Conclusions and some guidelines for the future*

As seen in the sections above, Spain's model of Islamic integration, in its juridical framework, is a balanced moderate type of communitarism developed in dialogue with Catholic views on religious freedom and Church–State separation. The view of society and the human beings within it is well developed and solid and has worked

well when offering an initial juridical framework to welcome the small incipient presence of Islam in Spain since 1978.

This juridical framework has allowed great historical steps forward to be taken in the acceptance of Muslim communities in Spain. Even if there are other reasons behind it, there has been less tension in Spain between Muslim communities and the rest of society than in other European countries. It is also important to note that, at the same time, Muslims declare themselves to be satisfied in general with their integration in Spain, as is evidenced in some statistics.

However, the model has also shown clear limitations. Firstly, all religions are somehow assimilated with the organization of the Catholic Church, which makes their official representation very artificial. Therefore, Spain's integration model ignores Islam's inner pluralism, fostering conflicts within the Muslim community. Secondly, it naively supposes the full acceptance of separation between Church and State, which the Spanish Muslim mindset has not fully assimilated. Finally, the growth of Muslim communities in Spain and their process of ghettoisation have surpassed the resources of the juridical model, which pushes local authorities to develop more assimilationist interventions.

Because of its good fruits, the challenge now is not so much to change this juridical model as to continue developing it in order to respond to the current reality of the growing Muslim presence in Spain. In this sense, to start out with, they would have to abandon a certain historical perspective of the role of Islam in Spain. The challenge today is not to reflect on the role of Al–Andalus in Spanish identity, but a much more practical issue. The challenge today is to fully incorporate Muslim citizens into Spanish society. A good step in this direction would be to dig deeper into Muslim views on society and the religious community in order to offer a more accurate framework for Muslim representation with respect to political authorities. It should be possible to reflect Islam's great inner pluralism in the structures of representation, especially taking into account that Spanish Islam is almost entirely Sunni Islam. In any case, it is clear that the idea of a single representative entity, the Spanish Islamic Commission, does not really reflect the reality of Spanish Islam.

After recognizing the Catholic inspiration behind the Spanish model, it is important also to develop a good rapport between Catholic social thought and Muslim social vision. Such a dialogue would enhance a better understanding between Muslim communities and the rest of Spanish society. In this sense, a good starting point is acknowledging that there is a clear coincidence in the role both traditions of thought bring to the religious community and their contribution to the life of its members. In this sense, clearly both traditions of thought reject a radical assimilationist model that impedes public and social dimensions of religion. Moreover, both recognize the role of the religious community for the individual and society.

Another point of coincidence would be what they consider to be the role of the State in society. In this sense, it would be easy for the Muslim community to defend a more explicit moral role of the State as more recent Catholic social thought demands. In this respect, both religious traditions start to distance themselves from liberal polit-

ical views. The point would be to find a common ground on which to formulate this moral role of the State. It would be interesting to explore natural law as a common ethical paradigm for both religions.

There are, however, several points of strong divergence. For example, it is much more problematic to discuss the role of individual freedom, particularly religious freedom and, therefore, the separation between religion and State. While the Catholic position on this issue is today fully in accord with the Western tradition of democracy, religious freedom and Human Rights, Muslims still hesitate to accept these values. Although Muslims living in the West most probably would recognize the importance of these values, they are still not integrated into the Muslim tradition and remain foreign to the Muslim mindset, especially that of traditional old–world Muslims like many of the migrants arriving in Spain.

Secondly, with respect to the valorization of the Catholic background of Spanish culture, we must admit that it becomes problematic for Muslim tradition which, when faced with accepting the Catholic roots of Spanish culture, would accentuate the experience of being in *Dār Al–Ḥarb* and not in *Dār Al–Islām*. The goal should be rather to make them feel that they can fully live Islam in a pluralistic Spanish society.

Therefore, in order to develop the Spanish model of Islam integration in response to today's challenges, some important steps to be taken could include the following.

Firstly, a huge task would be to help Spanish Muslim communities to undertake inner reflection on the main Western political values. This reflection has already begun in some intellectual Muslim circles[67] and should concentrate on the sense of living Islam in non–Islamic countries and the presence of such values as democracy or religious freedom in Islamic sources. More profound reflection on the concept of *"house of agreement" (Dār al–Sulḥ)* could be very helpful.

Secondly, Spanish society should work to improve the State's and the Catholic Church's knowledge of Islamic tradition and the current state of life in Muslim communities. This would help develop better instruments for representation, and cease the assimilating of Muslim communities within the structure of the Catholic Church.

Thirdly, it is very important to fight against the ghettoisation of Muslim quarters in cities. This effort should include at the same time social aid and the establishment of more points of contact and encounters with the rest of society.

Fourthly, given the Catholic presence and influence in Spanish society – still very significant in spite of present–day secularization – the Catholic Church should share with Muslim communities the main principles and values of its social tradition in order to facilitate their understanding of the ideas behind the structure of Spanish society.

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[67] Cfr. for example A.A. An–Na'im, *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2008; N. Majid, *The True Face of Islam: Essays on Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, Voice Center Indonesia, Ciputat 2003; T. Ramadan, *Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity*, The Islamic Foundation, Markfield, U.K. 2004.

Finally, a dialogue should commence on the many cultural and popular Spanish expressions of Catholic inspiration. The goal of this dialogue should not be to banish these expressions, but rather to ensure that Muslims feel at home in Spanish society. It might be helpful in this sense to include some expressions of Muslim culture in Spanish society in order to make real religious pluralism fully visible.

In summary, the Spanish model of Islamic integration is based on good and valuable intuitions that have proven to be very useful in the initial stages of the arrival of new Muslim population. However, due to their growing numbers and the resulting challenges involved, the model is already exhausted and needs further work. This development today consists of abandoning the more romantic and historical approach to Islamic presence in Spain and focusing on the current real–life problems of Muslim communities. This requires a deeper knowledge of Islamic tradition and a strong concern for the material and spiritual well–being of Muslim members of Spanish society.

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RÉSUMÉ

La présence musulmane en Espagne est bien plus récente que dans d'autres pays européens, si bien que parfois l'existence, dans ce pays, d'un vrai modèle d'intégration n'est pas claire. Cependant, la considération du cadre juridique permet d'identifier un modèle clair d'intégration religieuse pluraliste qui a permis à la communauté musulmane de s'établir et de croître en Espagne depuis le début de la démocratie. Aujourd'hui, la croissance rapide de la communauté musulmane est en train de pousser ce modèle jusqu'à ses extrêmes limites. Le modèle d'intégration est en partie inspiré par les idées de la pensée sociale catholique relative à la liberté religieuse et à la démocratie, et il peut être qualifié de communitarisme modéré. Une considération du point de vue musulman nous permet de percevoir les réalisations de ce modèle et de prévoir certains développements rendus nécessaires en vue d'affronter les défis d'aujourd'hui.